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Abstract 
 
The development and use of a Safety Input Review Committee (SIRC) process promotes 
consistent and disciplined Accident Analysis (AA) development to ensure that it accurately 
reflects facility design and operation; and that the credited controls are effective and 
implementable. Lessons learned from past efforts were reviewed and factored into the 
development of this new process. The implementation of the SIRC process has eliminated many 
of the problems previously encountered during Safety Basis (SB) document development. This 
process has been subsequently adopted for use by several Savannah River Site (SRS) facilities 
with similar results and expanded to support other analysis activities. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2002 a new Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and associated Technical Safety 
Requirements (TSRs) for the SRS Tank Farm facilities were developed in accordance with the 
requirements and guidance provided in DOE-STD-3009-941 to comply with 10CFR830 
Subpart B2. In preparing for this substantial effort, a review of past experiences with Tank Farm 
SB development, implementation, and maintenance efforts was conducted to identify lessons 
learned that could be applied to the new DSA/TSR development effort. This review identified 
the following key issues: 
· The facility engineering staff did not consistently display a strong ownership or 
understanding of the facility SB; instead they typically deferred to Regulatory Program 
personnel or to Washington Safety Management Solutions (WSMS) safety analysts that 
supported facility operations. 
· During SB development there was a lack of a formal and clear communication 
mechanism between the facility engineering staff and the safety analysts with respect to 
accident scenario development and the specification of applicable inputs and 
assumptions. 
· The control selection process was typically not performed in a collaborative manner with 
operations participation. This resulted in controls that were sometimes difficult or 
cumbersome to implement. Additionally there was a heavy reliance on the use of 
administrative versus engineered controls, even where engineered controls were 
sometimes available. 
· Senior management was not typically involved in the SB development process until the 
final SB document approval stage. This resulted in significant rework and schedule 
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slippage when senior management directed an alternate analysis approach or control 
scheme. 
 
An evaluation of these key issues concluded that there was a compelling need to devise a new 
and deliberate process for the development of the Tank Farm DSA and TSRs. The SIRC process 
was expressly developed to satisfy this need. 
 
 
SIRC Process 
 
The SIRC process was developed to provide a disciplined review and approval process for 
critical aspects of the Tank Farm DSA/TSR development effort. Figure 1 provides a depiction of 
the principal steps of the SIRC process. A key element of this process is the assignment of a 
facility Design Authority (DA) engineer as the “owner” for each accident. The assigned DA 
engineer is responsible for: 
· developing accident progressions, facility inputs and assumptions, and analysis approach; 
· identifying the need for Safety Class (SC)/Safety Significant (SS) controls based upon the 
results of the unmitigated analyses; 
· leading the development of effective control sets and verifying the adequacy of the 
controls; 
· identifying and initiating further control evaluations (e.g., backfit analyses, Natural 
Phenomena Hazard [NPH] qualification analyses, instrument uncertainty calculations); 
· serving as the principal facility reviewer of the applicable DSA/TSR sections; and 
· serving as the primary spokesperson for the assigned accident during SIRC reviews and 
subsequent reviews with the Department of Energy (DOE) and with Defense Nuclear 
Safety Facility Defense Board (DNFSB) staff members. 
The assigned DA engineer is paired with an accident analyst to foster a team approach, 
augmented as needed with support from other organizations (e.g., Operations, Regulatory 
Programs). 
 
Although much of the discussion in this paper is focused on AA, the SIRC process has also been 
used to provide a forum for the review and approval of selected key inputs and assumptions for 
Hazard Analyses. This has been particularly useful when the Hazard Analysis for a major 
modification concludes that there is no need to credit any controls for the facility/collocated 
workers. 
 
SIRC Membership and Responsibilities 
 
The SIRC Process provides for a two tiered approach to the review and approval of AA 
information, including a SIRC Subcommittee and a Senior SIRC. The SIRC Subcommittee is 
composed of experienced representatives from the DA Engineering, Regulatory Programs, 
Operations, Safety Analysis, and DOE Engineering organizations. This group is responsible for 
the review and approval of the unmitigated AA progression(s), analysis approach, key inputs and 
assumptions, unmitigated AA consequence results evaluation, control selection, and mitigated 
AA results. Additionally the SIRC Subcommittee can be used as working forum to develop 
facility positions on specific SB issues. Approval by the SIRC Subcommittee requires a 
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Figure 1 SIRC Process. 
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consensus of the members. The Senior SIRC is composed of senior managers from the same 
organizations represented on the Subcommittee. Approval by the Senior SIRC requires a 
unanimous decision by the voting membership. Although DOE management participates in the 
Senior SIRC, they are not voting members. DOE’s membership is intended to promote 
communication of expectations between the DOE and the contractor and to lend their perspective 
on key issues/concerns. The Senior SIRC is responsible for reviewing selected key inputs and 
assumptions, and all unmitigated AA consequence results evaluations, control selections, and 
mitigated AA results. Additionally the Senior SIRC is responsible to disposition any 
vulnerabilities identified for the approved controls. 
 
The participation of the DOE in the SIRC process has to be managed in a manner that balances 
its involvement in the process with its mandated oversight role. Approval via the SIRC process 
can not be construed by the Contractor as a guaranty of obtaining DOE approval when the 
associated SB documents are subsequently submitted. As non-voting members of the SIRC 
Subcommittee and the Senior SIRC, the DOE is under no obligation to pass judgment on the 
material presented in SIRC meetings. Our experience with the DOE’s participation in the SIRC 
process to date has not been problematic in this respect. Additionally the DNFSB site 
representatives have been invited to observe Senior SIRC meetings as a means to ensure that 
they have the opportunity to be aware of significant SB development decisions and associated 
rationale on a real time basis. 
 
Unmitigated Analysis  
 
The responsible DA engineer, together with the accident analyst will review the supporting 
Hazard Analyses and identify those Hazard Events requiring further evaluation as Design Basis 
Accidents (DBAs) for the accident of interest. The review will identify the initiators for the 
assigned accidents so that the progression(s) can be accurately defined. The review will further 
identify those inputs and assumptions that are required for the analysis and that are within the 
purview of the facility (typically design, process, or operational in nature). Formal 
documentation of these inputs and assumptions via Safety Analysis Input Sheets is required to 
ensure that adequate technical rigor is embedded in the development process and to provide a 
review vehicle for the SIRC process. These input sheets are also used to document the Material 
at Risk to be used in the analysis (i.e., the material characteristics and volume/quantity/rate 
involved in the unmitigated scenario). To avoid duplication, the development of the input sheets 
is coordinated via the SIRC Subcommittee since some inputs and assumptions can be used in 
multiple AAs. The input sheets are not intended to take the place of formal calculations or 
technical reports. All calculationally-derived inputs must be based on an approved and confirmed 
(i.e., no open items) calculations/technical reports. Table 1 identifies and describes the 
information that must be addressed within the Safety Analysis Input Sheets. 
 
The remaining source term parameters (Damage Ratio, Airborne Release Fraction, Leak Path 
Factor, and Respirable Fraction) are developed by the responsible DA engineer together with the 
analyst. Although these values are reviewed via the SIRC process, they are not required to be 
documented via Safety Analysis Input Sheets since these are typically well established for a 
given scenario based on the use of DOE-HDBK-30103 unless the use of a nonstandard source 
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term parameter value is recommended (e.g., an ARF for a spray from a leaking jumper 
connector). 
 
Table 1 Safety Analysis Input Sheet 
 
Input Name 
 
Provide descriptive noun name (e.g., Pump Tank Volume) 
 
Conservative 
Direction 
 
Identify direction of input value that results in a higher consequence 
 
Safety Analysis 
Use 
 
Briefly describe intended analysis use(s) 
 
Normal Range 
 
Identify normal operating range of input parameter 
 
Inherent 
Controls 
 
Identify any controls that are inherent in the input/assumption and that must be 
protected to preserve the adequacy of the analysis 
 
References 
 
Identify supporting references (e.g., calculations, technical reports, handbooks, 
drawings, specifications) 
 
Historical Events 
 
Briefly summarize actual operating experience that may be useful to support the 
recommended input/assumption 
 
Physical 
Limitations 
 
Describe any applicable physical limitations inherent in the input/assumption 
 
Safety Analysis 
Value 
 
Specify value to be used in accident analysis 
 
Justification 
 
Provide technical justification for the recommended Safety Analysis Value 
addressing both its adequacy and appropriateness with references as needed 
 
Assumptions 
 
Identify and justify any assumptions made in arriving at the recommended 
Safety Analysis Value 
 
The responsible DA engineer and analyst will mutually establish a recommended analysis 
methodology approach. In the past, many Tank Farm AAs were performed as single point 
analyses (i.e., the analysis calculated a consequence based upon a single input value). Any 
subsequent changes in input values required revised analyses to be performed. This inefficient 
use of limited analysis resources often resulted in undesirable cost and schedule impacts. In 
recognition of this, a concerted effort is made to encourage the use of alternate approaches, as 
appropriate. Such approaches include the use of “Victory” analyses (backwards calculation of 
what value a key input parameter would have to be for the resulting consequence to reach an 
Evaluation Guideline [EG]) and “Ruler” analyses (parametric type calculation of consequence as 
a function of a key input parameter). These types of calculations are sometimes useful in 
assessing the relative sensitivity of the analysis results to a given input/assumption. 
 
The responsible DA engineer presents the accident progression(s) (including source term 
information as described above), Safety Analysis Input Sheets, and recommended analysis 
approach to the SIRC Subcommittee. The SIRC Subcommittee reviews are typically very 
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detailed in nature and often take the form of an “oral board” in which the engineer is expected to 
vigorously defend the proposed AA information. Aside from ensuring the technical adequacy of 
the information presented, the SIRC Subcommittee also verifies that the information is 
consistent, as applicable, with information previously approved for other AAs. The SIRC 
Subcommittee can approve the information as presented, approve the information with 
comments (requires subsequent SIRC Subcommittee Chair review to verify satisfactory 
completion of assigned open items), or reject all or part of the information (requires subsequent 
SIRC Subcommittee review of all rejected items). Once SIRC Subcommittee approval is 
obtained, the Chair is responsible to determine which, if any, of the unmitigated AA information 
requires further review by the Senior SIRC. This determination is typically based upon: the 
relative complexity of an input or assumption (especially where the input/assumption is primarily 
based upon a qualitative argument such as a maximum postulated spill size); the use of non-
standard inputs/assumptions (Leak Path Factor < 1.0) or analysis approaches; and whether a 
similar input/assumption has previously been reviewed by the Senior SIRC. Those progressions, 
Safety Analysis Input Sheets, and analysis approaches requiring further review will be presented 
to the Senior SIRC by the responsible DA engineer. This review is typically not as detailed as the 
SIRC Subcommittee review and tends to focus on the larger implications of the information 
presented. Unmitigated AA can be completed once the required SIRC Subcommittee and Senior 
SIRC approvals have been obtained. 
 
Control Selection/Mitigated Analysis 
 
The responsible DA engineer will evaluate the results of the unmitigated AA with the analyst to 
assess whether the consequence results challenge the Offsite EG defined in DOE-STD-3009-941 
or the Onsite Facility Worker and Collocated Worker consequence limits defined in Washington 
Savannah River Company (WSRC) Manual E7 Procedure 2.254, thus determining the need for 
Safety Class (SC)/Safety Significant (SS) controls. For the purposes of this paper, the Facility 
Worker and Collocated Worker consequence limits will hereafter be referred to as the Onsite 
EGs. Controls are selected in accordance with the requirements of the governing SRS functional 
classification procedure4 using a team approach, led by the responsible DA engineer, which as a 
minimum includes the analyst and representatives from Operations and Regulatory Programs. 
The control selection hierarchy guidance (preventive versus mitigative, engineered versus 
administrative, active versus passive, control barrier selected closest to the hazard) is factored 
into the selection process as well as the need for controls that provide significant defense in 
depth. The team approach is used as a means to counteract the subjective nature of the control 
selection process and to provide a collaborative evaluation of the effectiveness of the controls as 
well as the facility’s ability to implement the proposed controls. Where existing structures, 
systems, and components (SSCs) are selected, the DA Engineer will initiate the required 
evaluation activities (formal backfit analyses, NPH qualification analyses, uncertainty analyses, 
etc.). Additionally, if an administrative control is selected, the team will evaluate whether the 
proposed control rises to the level of a Specific Administrative Control (SAC) in accordance 
with DOE-STD-11865. 
 
In some situations vulnerabilities may be identified during the control selection process or the 
subsequent evaluation of newly credited existing SSCs (e.g., no available means to prevent a 
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flammable mixture from forming in the vapor space of a process vessel during or following a 
seismic event). Such vulnerabilities must be evaluated and dispositioned. 
 
The responsible DA engineer will present the results of the unmitigated AA and the proposed 
control selections to the SIRC Subcommittee for review and approval. This detailed review 
verifies whether the: 
· consequence results challenge the Offsite or Onsite EGs (i.e., Are controls required?); 
· control selection is consistent with the hierarchy guidance and, if not, whether such 
deviations are appropriate; 
· controls represent a complete set (including consideration of support systems and all 
identified initiators for each progression); 
· controls are independent if multiple levels of control are proposed (i.e., primary controls 
and defense in depth controls can achieve their intended safety function without reliance 
on one another); 
· controls are the most effective controls possible, to the degree practical; 
· administrative controls (if any) should be designated as SACs; and 
· controls are implementable 
 
This review is highly subjective in nature and relies heavily on the collective knowledge and 
experience of the SIRC Subcommittee members. A technically inquisitive and thorough review 
is essential to ensure that a complete, effective, and defendable set of controls is selected. DOE 
participation at this level can provide the DOE with valuable insight into the overall selection 
process and affords the SIRC Subcommittee an opportunity to understand any concerns that the 
DOE representative may identify. This review may identify the need to revise previously 
approved progressions, inputs, assumptions, or analysis approaches and result in the need to 
reperform the unmitigated AA and control selection process. 
 
Once all SIRC Subcommittee action items have been resolved and approval obtained, the 
responsible DA Engineer presents the unmitigated consequences and control selection to the 
Senior SIRC. As previously discussed, this review is typically performed at a higher level than 
that of the SIRC Subcommittee and tends to focus on the “big picture” implications of the 
consequence results and the control selection. The Senior SIRC will review any vulnerability 
analyses performed for the selected controls. One of three potential vulnerability disposition 
options (or some combination thereof) is approved by the Senior SIRC: (1) elimination of 
vulnerability via facility modification; (2) mitigation of vulnerability via compensatory measure; 
or (3) acceptance of the vulnerability as is. Cost/benefit analysis results are typically used as 
guidance during this disposition process. The result of the vulnerability disposition is factored 
into the development of the associated SB document text. Mitigated AA and the development of 
the associated SB document sections can be completed once the required SIRC Subcommittee 
and Senior SIRC approvals have been obtained. If the mitigated AA fails to confirm the 
effectiveness of an approved control, additional control selection, review, and approval activities 
are required. 
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Use of SIRC Subcommittee as a Working Group 
 
In addition to the review and approval responsibilities described above, the SIRC Subcommittee 
can be used as a working forum to develop facility positions on specific SB issues. For example, 
during the implementation of DOE-STD-11865, the WSMS Regulatory Program group 
developed a preliminary assessment of which Administrative Controls should be designated as 
SACs. This assessment was reviewed in detail by the SIRC Subcommittee with a focus on 
defining the basis for why an Administrative Control was or was not designated as a SAC. The 
results of this review were subsequently documented in a formal technical report that was 
included as a reference in the DSA/TSR change package submittal to the DOE. Following the 
completion of the SAC designation reviews, the SIRC Subcommittee held a series of meetings 
during which each SAC was evaluated against the SAC considerations/attributes described in 
DOE-STD-11865 (e.g., LCO versus Administrative Control format, functional classification and 
reliability of SSCs used to implement the SAC, need for Human Reliability Analysis, need for 
additional operator training/drills). A detailed checklist, based on DOE-STD-1186 was 
developed and used to guide these evaluations. A great deal of effort was expended to define 
each SAC as clearly as possible and to identify any potential response actions, if a SAC 
requirement could not be met. The results of the SIRC Subcommittee evaluations were directly 
used as input into the SAC bases section development (author participated in the meetings). A 
brief overview of the SAC selection and evaluation results was presented to the Senior SIRC for 
concurrence. This review primarily focused on the implementation aspects of the SACs. The use 
of the SIRC process in the SAC development effort demonstrated the effectiveness of using a 
dedicated group of senior experienced personnel to resolve complex issues requiring 
consideration of a broad range of issues in a timely manner. 
 
 
Experience with the SIRC Process 
 
The SIRC process as described above was used in the development of the new DSA/TSR for the 
SRS Tank Farm facilities in 2002. The responsible DA engineers were subsequently able to 
effectively present the results of their effort to DOE and DNFSB staff personnel and resolve 
comments during the DOE review and approval process. These engineers returned back to their 
assigned facility positions and continue to serve as Subject Matter Experts for their accidents. 
Their participation in the development process, including the SIRC reviews, resulted in these 
engineers having an unusually comprehensive and valuable understanding of the DSA and TSRs. 
As part of the facility Technical Staff continuing training program, these engineers conduct in 
depth presentations on “their” accidents on a periodic basis. 
 
The new Tank Farm DSA and TSRs were approved by DOE and implemented in April 2003. 
Although technical comments/questions were generated during the DOE review process, the bulk 
of these had to do with the level of bases detail provided in these documents rather than on the 
accident analysis inputs, assumptions, consequence results, and control selection. The SIRC 
process was judged to be successful by all involved and was institutionalized and used by the 
Tank Farm for all subsequent SB document revision efforts. The end result has been SB 
amendments that are routinely approved by the DOE without significant review issues. The 
general level of ownership and understanding of the SB within the Tank Farm engineering staff 
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continues to increase as additional engineers go through SB document development/revision 
efforts via the SIRC process. 
 
The most common problem encountered in the SIRC process subsequent to the initial DSA/TSR 
development effort is the lack of preparation on the part of the responsible DA engineers and the 
lack of involvement of their managers in ensuring their readiness. This lack of preparation has 
resulted in having to conduct multiple SIRC Subcommittee meetings before approval is obtained, 
negatively impacting project schedules. A typical problem is a lack of technical rigor in 
developing and defining proposed inputs/assumptions (including a lack of documentation for 
calculationally-derived values). To address such difficulties, a SIRC process overview briefing 
was developed and is now presented to each project team (including project management 
personnel) preparing to go through the SIRC process. This overview includes examples of actual 
problems encountered in past SIRC reviews. 
 
The success of the SIRC process as used by the Tank Farms has resulted in the process being 
adopted by all other SRS Liquid Waste Operations facilities (Defense Waste Processing Facility 
and the Saltstone Facility) as well as by the Solid Waste facilities. Recently, the process has been 
endorsed for as a good practice for adoption by all SRS Hazard Category 2 nuclear facilities. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Experience with the SIRC process has demonstrated that the process provides an effective means 
to develop a technically sound SB and implementable controls. It has measurably improved 
ownership and understanding of the SB by the facility engineering staff; fostered a true 
partnership between the DA, Operations, Regulatory Programs, Safety Analysts, Senior 
Management, and the DOE in the development of accurate and implementable SB documents; 
and minimized the need to reperform AA and control selection work. 
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